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Note: The Role of State Deficiency Judgment Law
in FHA Insured Mortgage Transactions
I. INTRODUCTION
When the proceeds of a judicial foreclosure sale against a
defaulting mortgagor are insufficient to satisfy the mortgage
debt, state law typically provides that the mortgagee, following
state procedures, may obtain a judgment in state court against
the mortgagor for the deficiency.' However, when the unsatis-
fied mortgagee is the federal government in the person of the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the matter is tried in
federal court.2 The federal court may apply the state rule, or it
may, under its federal common law power, compel a uniform
disposition of such cases beyond the dictates of state law.3 There
is also a third possibility: adoption of a federal common law
rule that incorporates as its content each state's rule. Two dis-
tinct sets of remedies, therefore, state and federal, seemingly
dependent only upon the identity of the mortgagee, may be
available against the mortgagor.4 Thus the federal courts face
a difficult choice of laws problem, the solution of which is still at
issue among the circuits.5 However, the majority rule is that
state deficiency judgment laws should be completely disregarded
in favor of a uniform federal rule in the FHA mortgage context.
This note will critically examine that position and propose an
alternative rule-select incorporation of state law as the federal
common law rule.
1. See text accompanying note 16 infra.
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) (federal question jurisdiction of
the federal courts); 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1970) (jursidiction of the federal
courts where the United States is the plaintiff).
3. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See
text accompanying notes 35-37 infra.
4. Moreover, because an FHA mortgage gives the mortgagee the
option of bringing foreclosure proceedings himself under state law or as-
signing the mortgage to the FHA, the mortgagor has control over neither
venue nor remedies. 12 U.S.C. § 1713 (g) (1969).
5. The Second, Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held state de-
ficiency judgment requirements to be preempted in cases involving FHA
mortgages. See United States v. Merrick Sponsor Corp., 421 F.2d 1076
(2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Walker Park Realty, 383 F.2d 732 (2d
Cir. 1967); Herlong-Sierra Homes, Inc. v. United States, 358 F.2d 300 (9th
Cir. 1966); United States v. Flower Manor, Inc., 344 F.2d 958 (3d Cir.
1965). Cf. United States v. Wells, 403 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1968) (VA mort-
gage). The Tenth Circuit, however, holds that state law governs. See
Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Breeding, 211 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1954).
Cf. United States v. Inciardi, 258 F. Supp. 837 (Wi). Okla. 1966).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. FHA INSURANCE OF MORTGAGES
The FHA, under its general power to insure private mort-
gage loans,6 is not a mortgagee, but rather is a third-party in-
surer of the private lending institution actually advancing the
funds. The lending institution charges the mortgagor a small
premium to cover the cost of the insurance. Application for
FHA mortgage insurance must be filed on the forms approved
for use in the particular jurisdiction in which the property is
located.7 Full compliance with the terms of the mortgage in-
surance binds the FHA to indorse the mortgage for insurance.,
The only legal duty of the FHA is to protect the mortgagee
from default by the mortgagor.
The FHA considers the mortgage to be in default when the
mortgagor fails to make any payment due under the mort-
gage.9 When default continues for 30 days, the mortgagee is en-
titled to the benefits of the mortgage insurance upon "assign-
ment, transfer and delivery" to the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development ° of all rights, claims, other insurance and
any part of the loan not yet advanced to the mortgagor.1' The
mortgagee also has the option after a 30 day default to bring
foreclosure proceedings in its own name where a commercial
mortgage is involved.12
6. 12 U.S.C. § 1707 et seq. (1969). For general procedures and
processing of FHA mortgages see 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.140-.162 (1971).
7. 24 C.F.R. § 207.3 (a) (1) (1971). This requirement is often used
as the basis of arguments that Congress intended FHA mortgage trans-
actions to depend upon local property laws. See text accompanying
notes 51-52 infra.
8. 24 C.F.R. § 200.149(b) (1971).
9. 12 U.S.C. § 1713(g) (1969). Although the statute merely states
that default is the failure to make any payment due, the Commissioner
is given further rulemaking power to grant the request of the mortgagee
for extension. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1710(a) (proviso 7) (1969).
10. Although the FHA was originally an independent federal
agency, 42 U.S.C. § 3534 (1970) transfers and vests all the "functions,
powers and duties" of the FHA in the Secretary of HUD. It is provided
in 42 U.S.C. § 3533 (1968) that one of the Assistant Secretaries of HUD
shall head the FHA as the Federal Housing Commissioner and shall
administer programs related to private mortgages. See also 24 C.F.R. §
200.40 (1971), which provides for the appointment of the Secretary of
HUD by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1713(g) (1)-(4) (1970).
12. 24 C.F.R. § 200.155 (1971). See also 12 U.S.C. § 1710(a) (1)
(1970). In this circumstance the mortgagee must assign to the FHA
within 30 days of foreclosure to obtain insurance benefits. 24 C.F.R. §
203.359(a) (1971). See also 12 U.S.C. § 1713(g) (1969). Under 24
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An articulated policy of the FHA is to bid the fair market
value of the land at foreclosure sales.13 In fact, however, a fed-
eral statute expressly prohibits the FHA from bidding more than
the unpaid balance on the mortgage debt at foreclosure, which
is potentially considerably less than fair market value."4 As
a result, despite articulated policy, the mortgagor is rarely
compensated at fair market value.15
B. STATE DFaicIENCY JUDGNIE'T PROVISIONS
At least 34 states and the District of Columbia provide statu-
torily for deficiency judgments in the mortgage context.10 Spe-
C.F.R. § 207.258(c) (2) (i-iv) (1971), the mortgagee may foreclose
within 30 days of his announced intention to do so and, if local laws per-
mit, by any of the following means: 1) by obtaining possession of the
property and its income by voluntary surrender of the mortgagor, 2) by
instituting and prosecuting with reasonable diligence proceedings for the
appointment of a receiver to manage the property and collect the income
from it, 3) by availing himself of any other remedies available under
state law, or 4) by exercising the power of sale under a deed of trust
with prior approval of the Cmmmissioner. After foreclosure the mort-
gagee must assign to the FHA to become entitled to the remaining value
of the mortgage plus the reasonable expenses in foreclosing and con-
veying. 24 C.F.R. § 207.259 (d) (1) (1971). See also, 12 U.S.C. § 1713(h)
(1969). The mortgagee's option to assign directly to the FHA car-
ries a charge of 1% of the amount of the mortgage, which presumably
covers the foreclosure costs of the FHA. 24 C.F.R. § 200.155 (1971).
13. U.S. DEP'T or HousING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT (FHA), MAN-
uAL, Book 2, Vol. VII, § 72926, cited in United States v. Stadium Apart-
ments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 366 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. Lynch
v. United States, 400 U.S. 926 (1970). See 12 U.S.C. § 1713(k) (1969)
(authorization for FHA to acquire property).
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1713(k) (1969). See United States v. Stadium
Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 370 (9th Cir. 1970) (dissenting opinion).
15. Only in rare circumstances will the balance due on the mort-
gage debt equal fair market value-i.e., 1) when the land value remains
unchanged and the mortgage debt has not been reduced at all, or 2)
when the land value has depreciated by exactly the amount of the mort-
gage debt reduction.
16. In some states deficiency judgments are available under judicial
decisions: Schuler v. Fowler, 63 Kan. 98, 64 P. 1035 (1901); Young v.
Vail, 29 N.M. 324, 222 P. 912 (1924). The remaining states may either
consider deficiency judgments part of their state common law or simply
not allow such judgments. Some of these state doctrines are puzzling in
that older statutes allowing deficiency judgments exist but are not dis-
coverable in the present codes. See AiA. CODE § 6652 (1923); KAN. STAT.
Axxm. § 2356 (1922); Ivrsss. CODE ANN. § 1935 (1880).
Statutes establishing deficiency judgment procedures currently in
force are as follows: ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.100 (1962); Anm. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 33-725(B) (1956); ARK. STAT. AN. § 51-1110 (1947); CAL.
CODE Civ. PRO. § 580 (a) (West 1955); CoNNr. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-28
(1970); D.C. CODE ENcycL. ANN. § 45-616 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
702.06 (1969); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-108 (1948); ILL Arm. STAT. ch. 95,
§ 17 (Smith-Hurd 1935); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1815 (1968); IOVA CODE
1972]
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cific prerequisites to the mortgagee's obtaining such judgments
vary. In many states some form of notice to the mortgagor"
and strict adherence to the statutory time limits are necessary. 18
Penalties for failure to comply with these provisions are strict.
In some states, if the mortgagee fails to move for a deficiency
judgment within the requisite time, the proceeds of the sale are
considered to be full satisfaction of the mortgage debt.'0 Other
statutes in this situation give the mortgagor the right to petition
the court to mark the judgment satisfied six months after the
foreclosure sale.
20
Another important aspect of the state provisions is the fre-
quent limitation placed upon the amount of the recovery under
ANN. § 654.6 (1950); LA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 2771 (West 1961);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6203-E (Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE
(Rules of Civ. Pro.) Rule W75(b) (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 244, §
17A (1956); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3150 (1968); MINN. STAT. §
581.09 (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 443.240 (1952); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
93-6001 (1964); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-2139 (1964) (no deficiency on equit-
able foreclosure action but only an action at law on the dept, Federal
Farm Mfg. Corp. v. Claussen, 138 Neb. 518, 293 N.W. 424 (1940)); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 40.455 (1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524.8 (1955); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A: 50-2 (1969); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS § 1371 (McKin-
ney 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.36 (Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-19-03 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.08 (Anderson 1954);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 686 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2621.1-
.11 (1967); S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-86 et seq. (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 21-47-3 (1967); TEx. RULES CIv. PRoc. ANN. § 309 (1967); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-37-2 (1953); VT. RULES CIv. PRO., Rule 80.1(e) (1971);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.12.060 (1961); Wis. STAT. § 278.04 (1958).
17. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6203-E (Supp. 1970) (mort-
gagee must give mortgagor 21 days notice by registered mail of his in-
tention to seek a deficiency judgment at the foreclosure sale); MASS
ANN. LAWS ch. 244, § 17B (1956) (same effect); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2621.3 (1967) (notice must be given to the mortgagor 10 days before
the hearing).
18. Action for a deficiency judgment must usually be brought
within a specified time after the foreclosure sale. See NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 40.455 (1969) (three months); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-2 (1969) (three
months); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS § 1371(2) (McKinney 1965) (90
days); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1960) (90 days); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 2621.7 (1967) (six months). In addition, there is generally a statu-
tory time limit on the completion of execution under the deficiency judg-
ment after the time of sale. See M.D. ANN. CODE, (Rules of Civ. Pro.),
Rule W75(b) (3) (1971) (three years); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 244, § 17A
(1956) (two years); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1960) (three years);
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.08 (Anderson 1954) (two years on land with
dwelling for two families or less or used as a farm dwelling). Minne-
sota has no such specific time limit.
19. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS § 1371(3) (McKinney 1965); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 686 (1960).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2621.7 (1967) gives such a right to any
party six months after the foreclosure sale as long as the plaintiff has 10
days notice.
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the deficiency judgment.2 1  Generally such legislation credits
the mortgagor with the fair value of the property at the time of
the foreclosure sale, rather than the foreclosure price itself,2-"
but at present almost every state has a different formula for de-
termining the amount of the deficiency due.23 Most often there
is no presumption that the sale is for the fair market value of the
land,C 2 4 and most states require some form of appraisal. 25
Possession of a deficiency judgment may also determine
other legal relationships between the mortgagor and mortgagee
such as the reopening of the redemption period2 0 or the legal
basis for the appointment of a receiver in favor of the mortga-
gee.2 7 It may even provide a sufficient reason for giving the pos-
session of the mortgaged property to the purchaser until the end
of the redemption perioC28  Thus deficiency judgment provi-
21. Such antideficiency provisions are largely the product of the
Depression era when unscrupulous mortgagees abused the existing defi-
ciency judgment provisions. Brabner-Smith, Economic Aspects of the
Deficiency Judgment, 20 VA. L. REv. 719 (1934); Eaton, Deficiency Judg-
ments and Decrees, 20 VA. L. Rnv. 743 (1934); Perlman, Mortgage De-
ficiency Judgments During an Economic Depression, 20 VA. L. REv. 771
(1934); Comment, Depression Jurisprudence, 47 MICH. L. REv. 254 (1948);
cf. Poteat, State Legislative Relief for the Mortgage Debtor, 5 LAW AI
CONTEMP. PROBS. 517 (1938).
22. See G. OSBORN, MORTGAGES § 335 (2d ed. 1970).
23. The District of Columbia simply subtracts the proceeds from the
amount of the mortgage debt. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 45-616 (1968).
California subtracts the fair market value of the property at the time of
the foreclosure sale from the amount of the mortgage debt. CA. CODE
Civ. PRO. § 580 (a) (West 1955). Florida leaves the amount of the de-
ficiency judgment solely to the discretion of the trial judge. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 702.06 (1969). Washington requires that the purchaser bid at
least the minimum upset price set by the court. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 61.12.060 (1961). Presumably, Minnesota enters judgment in the
amount remaining due after the foreclosure sale proceeds are applied.
Mbnu. STAT. § 581.09 (1947).
24. See NJ). CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1960); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 278-
105(2) (1958).
25. See CAL. CODE CIv. PRO. § 580 (a) (West 1955) (appraisal by in-
heritance tax appraiser); Mn. ANN. CODE (Rules of Civ. Pro.) Rule W75
(b) (1) (1957) (by auditor's report); NEv. REv. STAT. § 40-457 (1967) (by
appraiser appointed by the court at the motion of the parties); N.Y. REL
PROP. Acmioxs § 1371(2) (McKinney 1965) (by the court at the motion of
the parties); N.D. CENT CODE § 32-19-06 (1960) (by jury or special grand
jury with 15 days notice to defendant); S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-88 (1962)
(by motion of any defendant within 90 days of sale); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 61.12.060 (1961) (by court at hearing on its own motion).
26. MAs.. ANN. LAWS, ch. 244, § 35 (1956) limits this right to
cases in which there is no power of sale in the mortgage.
27. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Illinois Steel Co., 174 Ill. 140, 51
N.E. 200 (1898); Russell v. Bruce, 159 Ind. 553, 64 N.E. 602, rehearing
denied, 159 Ind. 553, 65 N.E. 585 (1902).
28. See Brabner-Smith, supra note 21, at 722.
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sions not only seek to compensate the mortgagee for the unsatis-
fied amount of his mortgage debt, but also may determine the
property rights of parties to a mortgage transaction.
C. FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Federal law is interstitial by nature, legislating ad hoc solu-
tions with limited objectives against a background of existing
state law.29 Congress, by its enactments, seldom occupies a
field completely, but rather builds in various ways upon existing
legal relationships established by the states.30 However, in some
situations state law is simply incompatible with federal inter-
ests. In the absence of a specific Congressional enactment on
the point at issue, federal courts may create a law of their own
in these cases-federal common law.
Any modem analysis of federal common law must start with
Mr. Justice Brandeis' statement in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,'
that "there is no federal general common law. '3 2 However, by
ending the reign of "general" federal common law, the Erie
decision raised anew the problem of what law should apply
where strong federal interests are involved in a non-diversity
situation and no specific federal statute is applicable. 33 Thus a
post-Erie federal court in a non-diversity case may apply a "new"
kind of federal common law-what Judge Friendly calls "special-
ized," as opposed to general, federal common law.3 4
29. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 435 (1953).
30. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Govern-
ment, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). See Mishkin, The Variousness of
"Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National
and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. Rnv. 797, 811, 814 (1957).
31. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
32. Id. at 78. Cf. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 469 (1942) (Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opin-
ion):
The federal courts have no general common law, as in a sense
they have no general or comprehensive jurisprudence of any
kind, because many subjects of private law which bulk large
in the traditional common law are ordinarily within the province
of the states and not of the federal government. But this is
not to say that whenever we have occasion to decide a federal
question which cannot be answered from federal statutes alone
we may not resort to all of the source materials of the common
law, or that when we have fashioned an answer it does not
become a part of the federal non-statutory or common law.
33. Mishkin, supra note 30, at 798.
34. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 405 (1964).
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The landmark case in this area is Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States.35 The court there held that the rights and obliga-
tions of the United States on commercial paper of its own issue
are governed by federal law, thus disallowing the claim of the
Clearfield Trust Company that state law concerning unreason-
able delay in notification of forged endorsements should govern
to disallow recovery. The court held that "[i] n the absence of
an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fash-
ion the governing rules of law according to their own stand-
ards. '3 6 The court admitted that federal courts have the option
to select state law as the applicable rule, but claimed that such
a course would be singularly inappropriate under the circum-
stances of the case because it would subject the rights and du-
ties of the United States on its commercial paper to "exceptional
uncertainty. 3 7  Thus, the court in Clearfield recognized that
the need for uniformity in large-scale transactions by the United
States government requires the application of a single federal
rule rather than the application of conflicting state laws. Al-
though the amount of federal common law is much expanded
from its beginnings, Clearfield remains the basic guideline of
federal common law authority.
The courts tend to obscure their reasons for adopting or
rejecting state law in the general area of federal common law
under the Clearfield rule. In cases where federal statutory pol-
icy might govern or where the United States is itself a party to
the action, the courts tend to devise rules which dictate results
most favorable to the United States.3 8  In cases where state
law is selected, most courts are unclear whether the state rule
serves as the content of the federal common law or applies ex
proprio vigore (of its own force) to the case.30 This lack of
clarity can cause problems.4 0
35. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
36. Id. at 367.
37. Id.
38. See Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Cases, 69 YALE LJ.
1428, 1435, 1441 (1960).
39. The precedent value of the case hinges largely upon this deter-
mination. For example, if the rule of decision is clearly based upon a
broad reading of an articulated Congressional policy, an argument at a
later time that common law defenses under state law are available is
obviously of little value. Note, supra note 38, at 1452 n.162. Cf. Com-
ment, State Substantive Law Applies in Non-Diversity Actions When Lo-
cal Interests Predominate-United States v. Yazell, 65 MIcm L. REv. 359,
364 (1966).
40. In light of Erie there is no reason why federal common law
should not be made binding on the states through the supremacy clause
1972]
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III. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW BY THE FHA
A. VIEW CREST GARDEN
Although theoretically coming into court on an equal footing
with private litigants,4 1 the FHA traditionally receives special
treatment in the federal courts, such as exemption from certain
state statutes of limitations. 42 Not until 1959, however, in United
States v. View Crest Garden Apartments, Inc.,48 did a federal
court conclude that the source of law governing all relationships
between the parties to an FHA mortgage transaction is federal.
This decision marked the beginning of large-scale preemption
of state law in the FHA mortgage context.
In View Crest the mortgagor defaulted once on his FHA-in-
sured mortgage, negotiated directly with the FHA to reinstate
his insurance coverage, and then defaulted again. The FHA then
petitioned the federal district court for the appointment of a re-
ceiver to manage the property during the pendency of the
foreclosure action and to receive the rents. The mortgagor ob-
jected to the appointment of the receiver, arguing that the Na-
tional Housing Act refers to and adopts local law and that under
state (Washington) law the FHA failed to present a sufficient
showing to entitle it to a receiver.44 The Ninth Circuit, however,
rejected the mortgagor's arguments.
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 60 at 250 n.21 (2d ed. 1970). Friendly, supra
note 34, at 405. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398(1964) (federal law applies in dealings between private parties where
act of sovereign foreign state involved); Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S.
306 (1964); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Teamsters Local 174 v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). The argument has even been made
that the supremacy clause requires the application of federal common
law in all cases where a governmental agency acts within the general au-
thority delegated to it by Congress, even when such actions are in
derogation of common law. Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to
Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1084, 1097 (1964). The
problem of the courts unclearly labeling their reasons for selecting state
law, however, is perhaps less serious in relation to the supremacy clause
in the FHA mortgage area than in other areas because it is very unlikely
that the FHA will be the plaintiff in a state court proceeding.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Stinson, 197 U.S. 200, 205 (1905) ; Brent
v. Bank of Washington, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 596, 614 (1836).
42. See United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940). This
case allowed the FRA to make a claim against a decedent's estate despite
the running of the applicable state statute of limitations. It is still the
leading case in the area of federal immunity to state statutes of limita-
tions. See, e.g., Weissinger v. United States, 423 F.2d 782 (5th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Taylor, 333 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1964).
43. 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
44. The mortgagor based his argument that Congress intended to
adopt state law in the FHA mortgage transaction on the language in 12
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First, the court held that the source of the relationship be-
tween the parties to an FHA mortgage is federal and thus fed-
eral law, not state law, governs.45 Federal policy demands pro-
tection of the federal treasury and the security of the federal
investment. 46 Protection of the treasury in turn promotes
the prime purpose of the National Housing Act-facilitating the
building of homes by the use of federal credit.47 Second, the
court rejected the argument that the adoption of the state defi-
nition of "first mortgage" by the National Housing Act consti-
tutes Congressional intent to adopt state law in all related mat-
ters. In support of its position the court noted two other provi-
sions of the National Housing Act 48 which provide rights and
remedies that the FHA can pursue without any reference what-
ever to similar provisions under state law. 49 Moreover, the court
thought the mortgagor's state law argument particularly weak
in light of the stipulation in the mortgage agreement enumerat-
ing the conditions under which the FHA would be entitled to a
U.S.C. § 1707(a) (1969) that specifically states that the definition of
'irst mortgage" in the National Housing Act will be the definition used
in the state in which the real estate is located. There was no issue here of
the FHA's failure to fulfill the requirements of state law. See also 12
U.S.C. § 1713 (a) (1) (1969).
45. The court gleaned this conclusion from general case law in the
federal common law area. See Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29
(1956); United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Clear-
field Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); McKnight v. United
States, 259 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1958); United States v. Matthews, 244 F.2d
626 (9th Cir. 1957).
46. Four years later, the Sixth Circuit relied on this contention m
holding that the Michigan law of coverture does not provide an adequate
defense for nonpayment of a note signed on an FHA loan by a wife
whose husband was discharged in bankruptcy. United States v. Helz, 314
F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963). Unfortunately, the Helz court directly cited
only View Crest in reaching this result. Id. at 303.
47. Although an object of FHA-insured loans is to make credit
available to individual borrowers, the primary purpose is to attract loans
to help finance commercial developers and thus assure adequate financ-
ing for housing. United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423, 433 (1941); Deal v.
FHA, 260 F.2d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 1958). United States v. View Crest
Garden Apts., Inc., (268 F.2d at 383) cites the McKnight case (259 F.2d
540) for this proposition. See also 24 C.F.R. § 200.5 (1971).
48. 12 U.S.C. § 1713 (g) (1969) (FHA's rights on default); 12 U.S.C.
§ 1713 (k) (1969) (FHA's remedies on default).
49. The court evidently misunderstood the mortgagor's argument
concerning the adoption of the state definition of first mortgage by the
National Housing Act, taking it to mean that since Congress intended to
adopt the state law in one area it meant to adopt state law in all areas.
268 F.2d at 382. More likely the mortgagor was seeking to show that
state interests and definitions have been adopted without damaging the
policies of the National Housing Act.
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receiver.50 Finally, the court held that the FHA uses different
forms in different states51 simply for commercial convenience in
the planning and working stages of the mortgage agreement; af-
ter the default of the mortgagor, the policy factors favoring the
federal government's financial interests come into play and dic-
tate that federal policy must govern. -5 2  Thus while the FHA is
willing to use state law at the planning stages, it has federal
remedies available when the transaction goes awry.
Although View Crest might be thought to hold only that
the FHA need not show cause under state law for the appoint-
ment of a receiver where the mortgage itself spells out such
rights, it has not been read so restrictively. Almost every ma-
jor case involving FHA mortgages since View Crest has uncriti-
cally, and often summarily, cited View Crest for the proposition
that federal law is the governing source of the relationships aris-
ing from an FHA mortgage and that any local rules which limit
the effectiveness of the FHA's remedies cannot be adopted.5
Thus View Crest opened the way for a veritable onslaught in
preemption of state law by the federal courts in the area of Fl-IA
mortgages. 54
50. 268 F.2d at 382 n.1.
51. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
52. 268 F.2d at 383.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Walker Park Realty, Inc., 383 F.2d
732, 733 (2d Cir. 1967); Madison Properties, Inc. v. United States, 375
F.2d 740, 741 (9th Cir. 1967); Clark Investment Co. v. United States, 364
F.2d 7, 9 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Chester Park Apts., Inc., 332
F.2d 1, 3 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964); United States
v. Helz, 314 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1963); United States v. Academy Apts.,
Inc., 230 F. Supp. 110, 113 (D. Minn. 1963).
54. E.g., in Thompson v. United States, 408 F.2d 1075 (8th Cir.
1969), the court held that under the reasoning in View Crest an Ar-
kansas statute that required that judicial sale of land on credit did not
apply to the FHA. See Clark Investment Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 7
(9th Cir. 1966) (Idaho law permitting redemptioner to deduct rents re-
ceived by the holder of the land during the redemption period from the
amount due on the debt inapplicable where FHA is rent holder); United
States v. Chester Park Apts., Inc., 332 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. de-
nied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964) (appointment of receiver for FHA permissible
under express provision in mortgage even though such a clause is illegal
under state law); United States v. Helz, 314 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963)
(Michigan law of coverture no defense to non-payment of note signed
on FHA mortgage for wife whose husband was discharged in bank-
ruptcy); United States v. Forest Glen Senior Residence, 278 F. Supp. 343
(D. Ore. 1967) (federal law governs where parties intend to use federal
funds from the inception of the transactions); United States v. Academy
Apts., Inc., 230 F. Supp. 110 (D. Minn. 1963) (FHA has enforceable con-
tract right to a receiver and rents during the redemption period, even
against a state tax lien).
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B. FEDERAL DEFICIENCY JUDGME LAW
The post-View Crest tendency to apply federal law gives
added strength to the already existing federal common law of
deficiency judgments. It is clear that the federal courts have
the power to grant deficiency judgments to the FHA,5 not-
withstanding the fact that the FHA is limited by Congress to
insuring mortgages. Congress merely intended by that limita-
tion to exclude the FHA from the direct financing of new hous-
ing-not to authorize the assignment of claims without the cor-
responding rights of enforcement. 56 Thus there is a body of
purely federal law to which a court, encouraged by View Crest,
may turn after rejecting state law.
The federal common law of deficiency judgments is sub-
stantially less complex and detailed than the state provisions, one
reason being that there are no established guidelines except the
non-application of state laws limiting federal remedies in a partic-
ular case. Normally, a problem arises when the federal govern-
ment brings its action for deficiency after the expiration of the
state deadline. The federal courts allow this action, however,
reiterating the conclusion in United States v. Summerlin57 that
the United States in the proper exercise of its governmental
functions should not be restricted in its remedies by state stat-
utes of limitations."8 Such a holding in effect totally exempts
55. 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACUCE 2.06[8] at 393-94 (2d ed. 1970).
Old Federal Equity Rule 10, 266 U.S. 657 (1912), gave deficiency judg-
ments as a matter of right in the federal courts. See, e.g., Jefferson
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Buckman, 82 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1936); North-
western Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Keith, 77 F. 374 (8th Cir. 1896). The
comment to Federal Rule 18(b) indicates that a claim for a deficiency
judgment may be joined with both legal and equitable claims.
56. United States v. Woodland Terrace, Inc., 293 F.2d 505, 509-10
(4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961).
57. 310 U.S. 414 (1940).
58. Other federal agencies are also exempt from state statutes of
limitations. The case law regarding deficiency judgments in Veterans'
Administration (VA) loans is particularly close to the developments in
the FHA field. See, e.g., United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961)
(VA regulations override Pennsylvania statute requiring appraisal
within six months after foreclosure sale); United States v. Wells, 403 F.2d
596 (5th Cir. 1968) (Florida statute leaving discretion to grant deficiencyjudgment in hands of the trial judge inapplicable); United States v.
Rossi, 342 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1965) (obligation is personal to the debtor
so that VA need not give notice to bring deficiency judgment action as
required by state law); McKnight v. United States, 259 F.2d 540 (9th
Cir. 1958) (federal regulations override state deficiency judgment pro-
visions); United States v. Winter, 319 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. La. 1970);
1972]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the federal government from state statutory procedures. Thus
courts have allowed deficiency judgments after foreclosure sales
where the foreclosure judgements in the district courts provided
only that the master determine the deficiency and not that the
deficiency be assessed against the mortgagor, as required by
state law.59
Closely related to the disregard of state statutes of limita-
tions for the FHA's benefit is the elimination of corresponding
state statutory penalties for failure to bring the deficiency judg-
ment action within the time allotted. In United States v. Mer-
rick Sponsor Corp.,6 0 the court not only allowed the United
States to bring an action for a deficiency judgment after the
state statute had run, but also held the state rule for automatic
satisfaction of the mortgage debt after 90 days inapplicable.'1
In Herlong-Sierra Homes, Inc. v. United States,0 2 notwithstand-
ing an explicit state provision barring a deficiency judgment in
cases where the mortgage is secured by both real estate and chat-
tels,63 the court allowed the FHA a deficiency judgment upon
a showing that the high bid at the foreclosure sale was unrea-
sonably low. As in most cases concerning deficiency judgments,
the court did not cite View Crest, but manifestly relied on it
nonetheless. Neither of the courts seemed to require any showing
of the adequacy or strength of the federal interest. Moreover,
once the federal interest is presumed to operate, the courts seem
to automatically give federal content to the rule of decision. Nei-
ther result is supported by reason.
However, the federal courts may not be entirely free of
restraints in this area. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)
provides that "proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judg-
ment . . . [and] execution" shall be "in accordance with the
practice and procedure of the state in which the district court
is held" except to the extent that any federal statute is appli-
cable.64  Seizing upon this language, the Tenth Circuit, in Re-
Branden v. Driver, 293 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (federal policy on
collection of loans overrides agreement to construe deed of trust under
California law); United States v. Jones, 155 F. Supp. 52 (M.D. Ga. 1957);
United States v. Henderson, 121 F. Supp. 343 (S.D. Ia. 1953) (liability to
VA continues despite state foreclosure retiring the mortgage note).
59. United States v. Walker Park Realty, Inc., 383 F.2d 732 (2d
Cir. 1967).
60. 421 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1970).
61. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTioNs § 1371(3) (McKinney 1965).
62. 358 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1966).
63. CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 580(b) (West 1955).
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 69 (a) reads in relevant part:
[Vol. 56:463
FHA DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
construction Finance Corp. v. Breeding,65 held that a state stat-
ute providing for entry and enforcement of a deficiency judg-
ment is applicable in the federal courts under Rule 69(a) since
entry of the deficiency judgment in the manner specified is a
post-judgment prerequisite to the issuance of a general execu-
tion under state law. It further held that the mortgage was
not entitled to a deficiency judgment when it had not been timely
filed under the state law. This case engendered a line of district
and circuit court cases in the Tenth Circuit, which culminated
in United States v. Inciardi.6 6 In that case the court applied Ok-
lahoma's deficiency statute against the Small Business Adminis-
tration (SBA) on the theory that the state statute did not ex-
empt the United States from its purview.
Other circuits, however, do not accept the Tenth Circuit
view. For example, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Mer-
rick Sponsor Corp.,7 held that state deficiency judgment statutes
are merely statutes of limitations and not "processes to en-
force judgment" under Rule 69(a). 611 Under such a reading a
court can draw directly on the Summerlin line of cases,80 which
make state statutes of limitations ineffective to bar the rem-
edies of the federal government. More simply, a court could
conclude that Rule 69(a) was not applicable because the policy
of the National Housing Act governs the area and thus federal
law governs. Although most courts do not seem to consider the
specific problem which Rule 69 (a) presents, it is likely that con-
cern with federal government interests would dictate the adop-
tion of the Second Circuit's view in most courts.
The pervasiveness of the View Crest reasoning in the de-
ficiency judgment area, despite differing factual situations and
competing state laws, is evident. By starting (and finishing) the
Process to enforce a judgment for the payment of money shall
be a writ of execution, unless the court directs otherwise.
The procedure on execution, in proceedings supplementary to
and in aid of a judgment, and in proceedings on and in aid of
execution shall be in accordance with the practice and pro-
cedure of the state in which the district court is held, existing
at the time the remedy is sought, except that any statute of
the United States governs to the extent that it is applicable.
65. 211 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1954).
66. 258 F. Supp. 837 (W.D. Okla. 1966). Note that OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 686 (1960), which the district court ruled applicable to the
SBA, is similar to the New York statute involved in the Merrick Sponsor
case. See notes 60 & 61 supra.
67. 421 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1970).
68. Id. at 1079.
69. See note 42 supra.
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analysis with the federal interest, moreover, the courts have a
convenient tool to assure the application of a rule favorable to
the interests of the federal government.
C. STADIUM APARTMENTS
The most significant recent development in the View Crest
line is the case of United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc.70
Starting from the View Crest premise of the applicability of
federal law to the FHA mortgage situation, the court in Stadium
in effect permitted the complete negation of state redemption
statutes with regard to FHA mortgages. In doing so, the court
set the clearest ground rules yet for the preemption of state laws
by federal interests in the field of FHA mortgages.
Stadium Apartments obtained an FHA insured mortgage
loan from the mortgagee containing the following clause: 7 1
The Mortgagor, to the extent permitted by law, hereby
waives the benefit of any and all homestead and exemption
laws and of any right to a stay or redemption and the benefit
of any moratorium law or laws.
Stadium Apartments later defaulted on the mortgage and the
mortgagee assigned the mortgage to the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development.7 2 The FHA then brought suit for
the foreclosure of the mortgage in federal district court. The
court granted foreclosure in default, but included in the fore-
closure decree a one year period of redemption as required by
the state statute."' On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed.
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning began with the View Crest
holding that local rules could not be allowed to limit the effec-
tiveness of the remedies available to the FHA for the breach of
a federal duty.7 4 The court rejected the lower court's reason-
ing that the FHA cannot have greater rights as an assignee than
its assignor would have had under state law, noting that the FHA
was in a preferred position because of the overriding necessity
70. 425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Lynch v. United
States, 400 U.S. 926 (1970). This case has engendered extensive com-
ment elsewhere. See Note, Federal Courts-Refusal to Apply State
Redemption Statute to FHA Insured Mortgage Foreclosure, 17 WAYNE
L. REV. 178 (1971); Note, Federal Courts-Choice of Controlling Law in
Cases Involving Federally Insured Mortgages, 49 N.C.L. REv. 358 (1970);
Comment, State Redemption Statutes Not Applicable to Foreclosure by
the U.S. on FHA Insured Mortgage, 23 VAND. L. REV. 1384 (1971).
71. 425 F.2d at 359.
72. Action was taken pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1743 (c) (1969).
73. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 11-402(1948).
74. 425 F.2d at 367 (emphasizing View Crest, 268 F.2d at 383).
[Vol. 56:463
FHA DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
of protecting the security interests of the federal government.7 5
Congress, it held, had not adopted state law, but required
only that the mortgagee be given protection on default equal
to his protection under state law.76 The court also rejected the
argument that the numerous references to state law in the Na-
tional Housing Act as the substantive content of the federal pro_-
visions showed an absolute intention to adopt state law where
federal statutory law did not cover the precise point at issue.77
The court admitted that the qualifying phrase-"to the ex-
tent permitted by law"--in the mortgagor's waiver clause 8
might be read as referring to state law.7" However, the court
felt that such language probably referred to the law applicable
to the FHA mortgage. That law, the court concluded, is federal °
and allows waiver of the benefits of state law. There is no fed-
eral law which prohibits the FHA from conditioning its accept-
ance of mortgage insurance on the waiver of state redemption
rights by the mortgagor. Moreover, the court agreed with the
FHA contention that the state statute does not force the pur-
chaser at the foreclosure sale to bid the full market value of the
property. Thus, since the mortgagor need pay only the sale price
on redemption, the court thought that state law would compel
the federal government to absorb any loss of land value during
the course of the redemption period.8 ' The court determined
that the FHA should not be compelled to absorb or mitigate
such losses, because the government is not in the real estate
business.8 2
The dissent in the Stadium case, although conceding the
presence of a federal interest, could not find "an overpowering
motive of federal self-defense" which would necessitate the
overturning of state redemption statutes wherever FHA mort-
gages are involved.8 3 It determined that View Crest prescribed
75. Id.
76. Id. at 361-62. See 24 C.F.R. § 580.18 (1947 Supp.).
77. Id. at 361. This is precisely the argument made in View Crest,
268 F.2d at 382-83.
78. See text accompanying note 74 supra. As the dissent in Sta-
dium points out, waiver of the redemption right is specifically prohibited
by law in some states. 425 F.2d at 370 n.3 (dissenting opinion). See,
e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 2889 (West 1955).
79. 425 F.2d at 362.
80. Id. This result is based upon an uncritical reading of View
Crest.
81. Id. at 365 n.7.
82. Id. at 366.
83. Id. at 367 (dissenting opinion).
19721
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
a balancing test and concluded that the FHA would suffer
only minor harm compared to the benefit to national housing
policy in protecting mortgagors and junior lienors by use of
state redemption statutes.8 4 There is no reason why the FHA
should not be required to take the minimal risk of maintaining
the property during the redemption period. This argument is
especially weighty for states where redemption laws allow a fee
for such services 5 or allow the purchaser to collect rents during
the period.86 In short, the dissent considers the state policy of
redemption too strong to be abrogated by mere Congressional si-
lence.8 7
Both the majority and dissenting opinions agreed that View
Crest necessitates consideration of the governing interest of
federal law in this situation. However, despite the fact that
View Crest was more thoroughly discussed in Stadium than in
any other case since the original decision, the majority took
View Crest almost entirely at face value. There is really no
clear attempt to prove the adequacy of the federal interest at
stake. Moreover, Congressional silence here might indicate that
Congress has deemed the redemption right "neither so inimicable
nor so beneficial to the operation of the government program
as to require upsetting determinations of the individual states."88
The decision diminishes legal certainty by providing two re-
demption rules, one where the government is a party and
one where it is not.8 9
Even beyond the result in the Stadium case itself and its
effect on state redemption laws, the decision is a staggering ex-
pansion of federal preemption of state law. The remainder of
this note will return to state deficiency judgment statutes and
84. Id. at 372.
85. See Clark Investment Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 7 (9th Cir.
1966) which involves such a law of Idaho, the very state in which Sta-
dium arose.
86. See United States v. West Willows Apartments, Inc., 245 F.
Supp. 755 (E.D. Mich. 1965) where the court allowed the FHA to consent
to the inclusion of a redemption period. The theory was that since the
state statute provided that the mortgage holder could collect rents dur-
ing the redemption period, the FHA as holder would suffer minimal
financial harm.
87. The majority notes that 26 states have post-foreclosure re-
demption provisions. 425 F.2d at 364 n.4.
88. Note, State Statutory Redemption Rights and the FHA: Recon-
ciliation of Real and Illusory Conflicts, 49 B.U.L. REv. 711, 724-25 (1969)(written in anticipation of the Stadium result).
89. Note, Choice of Controlling Law in Cases Involving Federally
Insured Mortgages, 49 N.C.L. REv. 358, 366 (1970).
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attempt to develop a reasonable alternative that would prevent
their total extinction in the area of FHA mortgages.
IV. ANALYSIS: BALANCING STATE AND
FEDERAL INTERESTS
A. UNiFommT: Tim USE OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Underlying the choice of federal law over state deficiency
judgment statutes for FHA benefit is the desire of the courts to
protect the security interests of the federal government by pro-
viding a uniform body of administrative law. Abstractly, uni-
formity is desirable for several reasons: fairness demands that
federal remedies should not vary from state to state; 0 in-
dividuals prefer one set of rules to govern similar transactions;91
and uniformity lessens the administrative burden on the fed-
eral government. 92  It might also be possible that the federal
courts wish to create a rule favorable to the federal govern-
ment.
9 3
The "uniform" rule established by the View Crest line of
cases has taken shape solely from a rejection of state law where
it restricts the federal government. Such a situation leads to
only one certainty in the area-the preemption of state law.
The uniform federal rule has taken its form on a case-by-case
basis so that the federal government is not required even to plan
its transactions with an eye to the limitations of state law. In
order to determine whether this approach is legitimate, let alone
the most desirable, it is necessary to look more closely at the
federal common law power and the areas in which it is appli-
cable.
Clearfield undoubtedly established federal court power to
determine or create federal common law despite the existence of
state laws covering the same subject matter. Such power is not
total, however, but is restricted to non-diversity situations in
which the strength of the federal interest justifies the application
of a federal rule. The courts have developed five areas in which
90. Thus in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-
48 (1816), any form of uniform review of state decisions by the Su-
preme Court could have been destroyed if the state court position had
won out.
91. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 410 (1964).
92. See Comment, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE
L.J. 1428, 1438 (1960).
93. See Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate
Rules of Decision, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1084, 1095 (1964).
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the federal interest is deemed sufficient to justify the application
of federal common law.
The first area involves instances in which Congress has
manifested some interest in the specific point at issue in a statute
or federal program which has some bearing on that point, but
where the federal law or program is not mandatory. "" Some
courts hold that the mere existence of a federal statute or
regulation in the same subject area as the state statute is con-
clusive.9 5 Such a view, however, is overly arbitrary since it
fails to balance state interests against what might be a very
minor federal interest.96 In this area of federal common law
some evidence should be present in the legislative history or
statutory scheme to indicate that Congress considered the spe-
cific issue.97
The second area, closely related to the first, involves situa-
tions where there is no statute sufficient in itself to engender a
decisional rule inferentially, but where a court may nonetheless
conclude that the entire field is so dominated by federal statutes
and other indications of Congressional interest that all legal
relationships in the area must be governed by federal law. 8 This
problem differs from the first in that the statute need not be
relevant to the specific issue but merely to the general area in
which the specific issue arises. In this instance federal common
law effectuates the policy of federal acts and programs by ex-
tending the federal rule to issues not specifically covered by the
language of the federal statutes.99
94. Compare concurring opinion of Harlan, J. in Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). If federal law were manda-
tory, it would apply from the statute of its own force without need for
the vehicle of federal common law. This first category seeks to include
the situation where Erie does not require the application of state law in
federal courts and federal statutory law does not cover the specific point
at issue. Cf. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence
& Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules For Decisions,
105 U. PA. L.J. 797, 799 (1957).
95. See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961) (regulation);
United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958) (statute).
96. See Note, Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1526-27
(1969).
97. Id. at 1522. Cf. Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal
Courts: Constitutional Pre-emption, 67 COLUm. L. REV. 1024, 1038
(1967); Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of
Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1090-91 (1964).
98. See, e.g., Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173,
176 (1942). Cf. Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate
Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1084, 1093 (1964); Comment, Rules
of Decision in Non-Diversity Cases, 69 YALE L.J. 1428, 1437 (1960).
99. Thus a court may use its common law powers to create entirely
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Third, federal common law applies under a broad reading of
the Clearfield case whenever the federal government performs a
constitutionally permissible function that is not covered by a
specific federal statute.10 0 This area is very broad and, in some
instances, extends even to the functions of federal agencies.' 0 1
Some caution is necessary, however, as is indicated by famous
dissenting opinion which would extend federal law to any trans-
action connected with federal currency simply because a federal
function is involved.
10 2
The fourth area uses federal common law to protect the fis-
cal assets and credit of the federal government.'03 This area
rarely takes on independent significance, but is usually tied to
a consideration of the third area and used as a factor to reinforce
the decision to apply federal common law in those circumstances.
Fifth, federal common law may apply largely because the
United States is a party to the action.1 04 The theory apparently
new substantive federal rights of action out of the policy of the federal
statutes. See, e.g., J. L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (private
right of action under the Securities Act of 1934); Textile Workers' Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (right of federal courts to compel
arbitration under § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act); Fitz-
gerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956)
(private right of action implied under the Civil Aeronautics Act); Reit-
meister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947) (private right of action
against person intercepting and divulging telephone conversations con-
trary to state law). Cf. Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal
Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REv. 285 (1963).
100. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943);
United States v. Chester Park Apartments, Inc., 332 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964); United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d
712 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964).
101. See United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959) (FHA); McKnight v. United
States, 259 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1958) (VA). Cf. D'Oench, Duhme & Co.,
Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
102. This result would obviously be an absurd intrusion on many tra-
ditional areas of state law governing actions between private parties.
See Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 199 F.2d 127,
133 (6th Cir. 1942) (dissenting opinion).
103. See Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956) (government
bonds); United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944);
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (government
payroll checks); United States v. Helz, 314 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963)
(FHA notes).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960) (tax
lien); United States v. Acri, 348, U.S. 211 (1955); Priebe & Sons, Inc. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947); United States v. Standard Rice
Co., Inc., 323 U.S. 106 (1944) (government contracts); Fansteel Metalur-
gical Corp. v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 268 (Ct. CL 1959) (federal
lien). There is some authority, however, for the proposition that Erie
demands the application of state law in federal courts even in the case
of federal question jurisdiction. Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Natl Bank,
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is that where the United States is a party, the question of reme-
dies in particular takes on a peculiar federal character and thus
federal law should govern.1° 5 Although there are still some
vestiges of "sovereign prerogative" thinking, ' °0 the better rea-
soning is that it is the federal nature of the function involved-
the source of the right sued upon-and not the grounds upon
which federal jurisdiction is based which should determine
the governing law.10 7
Any argument that state law should apply of its own force
in the area of deficiency judgments must deal with each of these
well recognized areas in which the federal courts have created
federal common law. Plausible arguments can be constructed
for each of the five theories. A court could conceivably read
the National Housing Act so that the first or second category
applies. Congress certainly has considered issues relevant to
state deficiency judgment statutes, but whether Congressional
pronouncements should be read to cover the whole field in the
absence of a specific statutory pronouncement on deficiency
judgments is uncertain. Clearly the View Crest line would
support the view that federal policy in the area is of overriding
importance. The large-scale nature of FHA involvement in
mortgage transactions clearly calls for consideration of the third
category-federal performance of a constitutionally permissible
function not specifically covered by federal statute. The poten-
tial damage to the federal security interest if the FHA is barred
306 U.S. 103 (1939). Cf. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop,
Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 541 n.1, (2d Cir. 1956).
105. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 306-07
(1947).
106. Cf. Gorrell & Weed, Erie Railroad: Ten Years After, 9 OHIO ST.
L.J. 276, 296 n.86 (1948); Comment, Erie Limited: The Confines of State
Law in the Federal Courts, 40 CORN. L.Q. 561, 569 (1955).
107. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d
538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956). See also United States v. Matthews, 244 F.2d
626 (9th Cir. 1957); Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formu-
late Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1094 (1964). Mishkin,
supra note 94, at 801 n.19, contends that the Clearfield case itself disre-
garded the fact that the United States was a party to the action because
the court did not mention the jurisdictional basis of the suit and because
it is impossible to limit the Clearfield rule simply by the status of the
parties to the suit. The test for the imposition of federal common law is
the presence of a sufficient federal interest which includes the United
States as a party but is not limited to such circumstances. See Comment,
State Substantive Law Applies in Non-Diversity Actions When Local In-
terests Predominate, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 359, 360 n.12 (1966). Mr. Justice
Douglas, author of the Clearfield opinion, is now on record to the con-
trary.
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by state deficiency provisions brings the fourth category into
play. Since the United States is a party to the action, repre-
senting the interests of the FHA, the fifth category is also rele-
vant. Thus the power to create federal common law rules con-
cerning deficiency judgment procedures in cases in which the
FHA is the mortgagee might be readily justified on the basis of
conformity to the entire range of established situations in which
the power to create federal common law exists.
Most courts in the View Crest line of cases ceased analysis
once it was concluded that a single category applied. After deter-
mining that damage would result to the federal interest in an
area in which a federal agency was functioning, the courts con-
cluded that federal law must apply. Furthermore, the courts
determined that the federal law must be uniform to the extent
that any state provisions which would bar federal government
remedies must be denied effect. There is a noticeable lack of
consideration of the other interests involved.
Federal courts clearly have the power to choose the appli-
cable rule in cases in which the FHA is involved. Such power
clearly includes the prerogative to formulate and apply a uni-
form national rule.1 08 However, there is no compulsion to for-
mulate a uniform federal rule without any reference to state law
simply because the area is federal. 0 9 The formulation of a uni-
form rule-especially one based primarily upon avoiding the
effects of established state law for the benefit of the federal
government-is not a necessary corollary of the power to choose
the rule of decision." 0 In fact, a court has three choices: 1) the
creation of a uniform federal rule solely on the basis of "federal
law," 2) the application of the state rule ex proprio vigore, or 3)
the selective incorporation of the state law as the content of the
federal common rule. A complete analysis requires review of
affected interests other than federal interests in order to de-
termine whether the strength of the federal interest is suffi-
cient to justify the preemption of state law.
B. EXPECTATION: THE INTEREST OF STATE LAW
An FHA mortgage transaction functions at two levels. On the
first level the FHA negotiates directly with the private lender-
108. See Mishkin, supra note 94, at 802.
109. Id. See also Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Fed-
eral Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 410 (1964).
110. Mishkin, supra note 94, at 802-03.
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mortgagee to insure the loan which the mortgagee will make to
the private mortgagor. At this point the federal government is
very much involved in negotiations with the mortgagee. On the
second level, however, the federal government is almost totally
uninvolved except as its interests are represented by the mort-
gagee. Here, the bargaining is between two private parties, the
mortgagor and the mortgagee. Each will be benefited and bur-
dened by certain well defined contract rights and obligations un-
der state law if the involvement of the federal government is
ignored. The question which must be asked is whether the ini-
tial federal involvement should preclude the application of state
law that normally would apply to transactions between pri-
vate parties at this second level.
State law, of course, governs all aspects of a mortgage
transaction between private parties from the construction of a
deed as a mortgage to the determination of the redemption
period. Nor can it be denied that the second level of the FHA
mortgage transaction is similar in almost all respects to the ne-
gotiations for a non-FHA mortgage loan between private parties
under state law. Although participation in the total transaction
by the FHA changes the character of the dealings somewhat,
the only effect induced by federal government involvement on
the second level of the transaction is extra payment for insur-
ance coverage. If the courts hold that the mere presence of fed-
eral funds changes the local negotiations so as to require the ap-
plication of federal law, as some courts intimate,"1 new prob-
lems arise. If the local bank does not explain the nature of the
FHA mortgage insurance to the uneducated mortgagor, will
the courts presume that the mortgagor had knowledge that fed-
eral funds were involved and thus that federal law applies?
Even if the mortgagor is aware of the use of federal funds,
does this knowledge give him adequate notice that his remedies
under state law, e.g., redemption, might be unavailable? The
proper concern in this area should be the strength of the state
law interest as manifested by the expectations of the parties.
The strength of the state interest is evident from the diffi-
culty courts have in justifying the blanket application of federal
law in the area. There is often a very thin line between the
111. E.g., United States v. Forest Glen Senior Residence, 278 F.
Supp. 343 (D. Ore. 1967). The court hinted that it might have read
state redemption laws into the mortgage but for the fact that all the
parties involved were aware of the presence of federal funds from the
inception of the transaction.
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creation of a security interest in the federal government under
state law and the remedies available to the federal government
under federal law.112 Even View Crest recognizes the pri-
marily local context of the mortgage transaction and the de-
sirability of deferring to state law as a matter of commercial
convenience at the planning stages. 113 The right to a deficiency
judgment under state law (and the corresponding unavail-
ability of a deficiency judgment if the proper procedures are not
followed) are both parts of the state system of remedies open to
the mortgagee. The original mortgagee would be restricted to
remedies under the state procedures were he not given the op-
tion of assigning the defaulted mortgage to the FHA.1"4 From
the standpoint of the mortgagor, the presence of the FHA does
not change the character of his default on the mortgage. The
mortgagee's option to assign the mortgage to the FHA, however,
can have a direct effect on the manner in which the mortgagor
must satisfy the mortgage debt. Moreover, the availability of
the option in only certain situations should not determine the
general rule, because such a consideration focuses attention on
only one of many interests involved."15
The strength of the state interest rests in the certainty of re-
sult for all similar transactions within the borders of the state.
If the mortgagee can overturn this certainty by assigning the de-
faulted mortgage to the mortgagee's insurer (the FHA), the very
purpose of the state statutes are defeated. The fact that this op-
112. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 408 F.2d 1075 (8th Cir.
1969).
113. 268 F.2d at 383.
114. 12 U.S.C. § 1713 (g) (1970). Where the mortgagee does not as-
sign the defaulted mortgage to the FHA, the foreclosure action which
he brings is merely an action between private parties under state law.
The exact proportion of cases in which the mortgagee avails himself of
this option is unknown. Generally, however, direct assignment to the
FHA would seem the most convenient choice unless the mortgagee had
some reason for wanting title himself. In any case the operation of the
mortgagee's option does little to mitigate the mortgagor's expectation
problems.
115. See 24 C.F.R. § 200.155 (1971). The regulation limits mort-
gagee's option to situations where project (commercial) mortgages are
involved. The effect of this distinction between home and commercial
mortgage foreclosures can be argued to show the FHA's deference to the
dictates of state law. Alternatively, this provision might show an espe-
cially strong federal interest in commercial mortgages since the FHA is
willing to take the risks of foreclosure itself in that area. The latter
argument is not determinative in itself, however, because the relevant
state and federal interests must still be weighed against one another.
The real question is whether even such indications of significant federal
interest are sufficient to overcome the state interests involved.
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tion is not available to the mortgagee can be argued to show
the FHA's realization of the strength of state interest in the
area. This is not to say that the protection of the federal se-
curity never outweighs the governing interest of state law
over what is primarily business conduct, but this state interest
must not be ignored.
In fact, both the federal courts and Congress recognize the
residual validity of the state law in certain cases. The courts
in fields other than FHA mortgages have drawn the line against
preemption of state law, even in the presence of a very clear
federal interest, where the state interest outweighed the hin-
drance to the federal program.1" 6 Even in the area under discus-
sion courts have disallowed deficiency judgments for the FHA
on a simple federal theory of equity-that the price paid at
the foreclosure sale was so grossly inadequate as to shock the
conscience." 7 Also, Congress frequently has relied upon state
definitions to determine the scope of the National Housing Act.' 1 8
116. Especially noteworthy in this regard is the case of United
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966). The Court held that the Texas law
of coverture provided an adequate defense for the wife of a bankrupt
husband on a note drawn by him to the Small Business Administration.
Unfortunately, courts since Yazell have universally distinguished its re-
sult from the FHA mortgage situation on the theory that the SBA has di-
rect contact with the borrower during the negotiations while the FHA
does not. See United States v. Thompson, 438 F.2d 254, 257 (8th Cir.
1971); United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 363 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Lynch v. United States, 400 U.S. 926
(1970); United States v. Merrick Sponsor Corp., 421 F.2d 1076, 1078 (2d
Cir. 1970); Clark Investment Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 7, 9 (9th
Cir. 1966). Moreover, the result in United States v. Helz, 314 F.2d 301
(6th Cir. 1963), which reaches the opposite conclusion from Yazell un-
der similar facts in the FHA mortgage field is approved in the Yazefl
case itself. 383 U.S. at 348 n.15. But see Sitton v. United States, 413 F.2d
1386 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 988 (1970). State law deter-
mined the amount of interest due on the deficiency judgment on a VA
loan because state interest became stronger after foreclosure. Ironically,
however, the effect of the decision was to require repayment to the VA
at a 6% interest rate under state law rather than 4% under VA regula-
tions.
117. See Magnolia Springs Apts., Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 726
(5th Cir. 1963). The dissent in Stadium argued application of this form
of the "clean hands" doctrine because under that analysis of the facts the
government acquired a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor for the
difference between the value set by the court for the land and the amount
of the unpaid debt. Mortgagor then bought at its own foreclosure sale
for less than half that price. 425 F.2d at 370.
118. For example, the National Housing Act allows "first mortgage"
to be defined on the basis of state definitions. 12 U.S.C. § 1713 (a) (1)
(1970). Furthermore, the regulations of the FHA provide that the va-
lidity of title to property purchased by the FHA must be determined
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Perhaps these factors in themselves do not militate against
the strict application of federal law against state deficiency judg-
ments, but at least they indicate that state interests do exist
and are recognized to some extent even in the field of FHA
mortgages. The question of the extent of application of state
law remains.
C. THE IwTEnEsTs WEIGHED
Weighing the expectation interest of parties under state law
against the interest of protecting federal security interests by
a uniform federal rule for a national program requires careful
scrutiny of the implications of each choice. The desirability of
uniformity in the area of FHA mortgages is manifest: ease of
governmental administration, protection of the federal treasury,
enforcement of rights otherwise unavailable under state law.
However, Congress, in the National Housing Act, does not re-
quire uniform application of a single rule concerning deficiency
judgments. Nor, for that matter, does it require a preferred po-
sition for the federal government's security interests. If not re-
quired, the mere fact that uniformity is desirable for its own
sake is only suggestive and surely does not compel a uniform
national rule.119 Furthermore, the very purpose of the National
Housing Act--"to facilitate the building of homes by the use of
federal credit"12 0 -does not require any greater protection of
federal credit than any other credit which is subject to state
laws. Indeed, perhaps the federal government should even be
willing to take the extra risks of state law to better accomplish
its purpose of encouraging home building by holding land dur-
ing state redemption periods or by subjecting itself to state
deficiency judgment provisions. Even now the FHA can acqui-
esce to such conditions. 121
under state law on the basis of state records and evidence customarily
used to prove title to property in the state. 24 C.F.R. §§ 207.35, 207.36
(a) (4) (1971). The regulations even make specific reference to the
preservation of remedies under state law where the mortgagee elects
to bring foreclosure himself. 24 C.F.R. § 207.58 (c) (2) (iii) (1971).
119. See Mishkin, supra note 94, at 813.
120. United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 383
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959). Cf. 24 C.F.R. § 200.5
(1971).
121. The View Crest result allows the FHA to acquiesce to practices
not specifically allowed under federal law but nonetheless included in
the general field covered by federal practice. Thus, in United States v.
West Willows Apts., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Mch. 1965), the court
allowed the FHA to consent to a redemption period despite the lack of
specific authorization in the National Housing Act when state law re-
quired that a redemption period be included in any title insurance. Un-
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On balance, the involvement of the FHA in the mortgage
transaction does not seem to remove the essentially local char-
acter of the events. The mortgage transaction and the deficiency
judgment procedure are regular events under state law be-
tween private parties. The FHA not only has no direct contact
with the mortgagor, but is also replete with regional offices and
well aware of the vagaries of local law, at least as applied to the
early stages of the transaction. Although the View Crest doc-
trine rejects as insignificant the fact that the FHA itself pro-
vides different forms for different states,122 this fact again be-
lies the claim that the FHA is not equipped to deal with local
law. The further distinction which the View Crest court itself
draws between local law at the planning stages and federal
law at the remedy stages 123 can only make sense where the fed-
eral security interest is strong enough to deserve protection from
state law.
The strength of the federal interest must ultimately depend
upon resulting damage if state law were to apply rather than
federal law. As long as the local rule means only inconvenience
in litigation for the federal government, and perhaps some small
financial loss, there seems to be insufficient reason to give the
FHA remedies which even the mortgagee cannot obtain on the
same default. Furthermore, this result should follow whether
the state deficiency statutes are read as substantive and juris-
dictional or as merely procedural devices since the strength of
the state interest vis-a-vis the private parties is equal under
either reading.
The final determination involves the question of what is the
true scope of the government's potential losses. The answer to
der the facts of this case, however, there was little chance of damaging
the federal security interest because the FHA would receive the rents
during redemption. Similarly, in Madison Properties, Inc. v. United
States, 375 F.2d 740 (1967), the court recognized that since there was no
applicable federal statute extending redemption, it use must be depend-
ent on state law. The question of the binding power of state law in such
a situation was not reached, however, since the court found proceedings
there initially defective under state law.
122. 268 F.2d at 383.
123. Id. This is an ingenious distinction, but it contains the seeds of
its own destruction. By deferring to local law in the planning stages,
the FHA shows that it recognizes and understands the workings of state
law. The only real issue left is measurement of the size of the burden
involved in FHA deference to local law beyond the planning stage. In
any case the FHA must show more than the fact that the mortgagor
has defaulted to bring federal law into play. If the FHA is geared to
operate under state law-or could be adapted to do so-the required
showing of federal inconvenience must be substantially greater.
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this question is not so obvious as some courts have thought. Sure-
ly if the federal government loses the right to a deficiency judg-
ment, after already having paid off the mortgagee under its in-
surance obligation, the government is left only with the proceeds
of the foreclosure sale or the ownership of the land itself. This
would only occur if the government failed to follow state proce-
dures of which it could have been well aware and was well
equipped to follow. If the proceeds of the foreclosure sale are
sufficient to satisfy the remainder of the mortgage debt, the
FHA loses no money whether or not the mortgagee assigns the
mortgage.124 Thus the loss the federal government might suf-
fer is merely the prerogative to ignore state law and not the loss
of a supplementary judgment remedy for the amounts left due
and owing on the mortgage debt.
V. A PROPOSAL: INCORPORATION OF STATE
LAW AS FEDERAL POLICY
The problem of the choice of law in FHA mortgage cases
involving state deficiency judgment statutes poses a dilemma.
If the federal interest is not strong enough to overcome entirely
the state statutory scheme but is nevertheless strong enough
to demand some protection for the federal interest, what rule
of law should apply and what should be its effect? Where fed-
eral interest in the general area is firmly established and the
parties are in a federal court because the United States is the
plaintiff, a court will be loath to apply state law ex proprio
vigore even if state interests outweigh federal interests on the
specific point. One possible solution is to recognize the gen-
eral coverage of federal common law where the FHA is in-
volved, but to give it consideration by selectively incorporating
the varying provisions of state law as the substantive content
of federal common law. "The scope of a federal right is, of
course, a federal question but that does not mean that its con-
tent is not to be determined by state rather than federal law." ' 5
124. This result is reached because the FHA either receives the pro-
ceeds itself if it has brought the foreclosure proceedings or is excused
from the payment of the insurance money if the mortgagee has brought
foreclosure himself and has not chosen to assign within a "prompt" time
as prescribed by statute. See 12 U.S.C. § 1710 (a) (1970).
125. DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956). Cf. Recon-
struction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946) (state law
governs the definition of "property" under the federal act where the fed-
eral act so provides); Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308
U.S. 343 (1939) (although state law is not controlling, it may be adopted
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This exercise, then, is similar to the actions of Congress in al-
lowing state definitions to serve as the substantive content of
certain provisions in the federal statutes.120
Selective incorporation has two main virtues. First, it es-
capes the wooden analysis that either federal common law with
a completely federal content applies to the case or that state
law applies of its own force. Given that bare choice, it would be
difficult indeed for most courts to conclude that federal interests
did not predominate. The selective incorporation approach rec-
ognizes the presence of the federal government in the field of
FHA mortgagees by acknowledging that federal common law
will govern, but that the content of such federal common law
will not be restricted. The uniform rule becomes the applica-
tion of state law through the exclusive vehicle of federal law.
Thus a court can fairly consider the weight of state law without
fear that adoption ex proprio vigore will destroy the federal
interests.
Second, selective incorporation allows much greater judicial
flexibility. In a case where the state law would work a true
hardship on the federal government, as in the case of an aber-
rant state law, the court can create an exception and apply a
"federal" rule. Such exception differs from the strict applica-
tion of a non-state rule initially in that the standard becomes
much more restrictive.1 27  Under the selective incorporation
analysis a court must first approach facts from the direction of
state law and preempt state law only when it works an unde-
niable hardship on the federal interest. Furthermore, the courts
could create exceptions to the use of state law under a general
rulemaking power in discrete areas where federal regulations
extend beyond the confines of state law.128 A second advantage
of selective incorporation appears where the state law specifi-
cally provides that no deficiency judgment is available under
state law in a certain class of cases, e.g., purchase money mort-
as the federal rule on the right to interest in an action brought by the
United States for state taxes improperly collected from an Indian).
126. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1713(a) (1) (1970), which defines "first mort-
gage" in terms of the state definition.
127. One solution proposed in the redemption field is to adopt
the "essence" of the state rule as the content of federal common law but
reject the accompanying provisions of state law. Note, State Statutory
Redemption Rights and the FHA: Reconciliation of Real and Illusory
Conflicts, 49 B. U. L. REV. 717, 739 (1969).
128. For general rulemaking power of the Secretary of HUD see 12
U.S.C. § 1702(a) (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 3535(d) (1970).
[Vol. 56:463
FHA DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
gages.129 Rather than simply give the federal government a de-
ficiency judgment in such a case, the court is forced to examine
the strength of the state policy. The court can conclude that
this rule is aberrant in the given case in that it grossly affects
the security interest of the federal government, but it also might
conclude that the general presumption in favor of applying the
state rule under the federal common law still exists. This rea-
soning would apply even in a case where the state law might pro-
hibit the granting of a deficiency judgment absolutely.
At this point there is a difficult theoretical hurdle. If the
federal courts were to adopt state law as the substantive con-
tent of the federal common law rule, would there be a different
federal policy for each state of the union? Does this not de-
stroy the very concept of a uniform national rule which the
federal common law seeks to establish? The answer to this
argument is that uniformity need not mean the application of
one sentence of black letter law in every situation similar on its
facts. Nor does a uniform rule mean that a uniform result must
occur. Under this proposal federal courts could apply state law
as the content of federal common law, except in situations
where such application would work an unendurable hardship
on the federal interest, as a matter of uniform federal policy.
Moreover, federal common law can only demand a uniform re-
sult when the federal interests warrant the upheaval of an es-
tablished system of state remedies and rights. In the case of
deficiency judgments, the strength of the federal interest, on bal-
ance, is not that strong. Furthermore, adoption of the state
law as the federal standard would remove uncertainty for all
three parties to the FHA transaction with only a minimal dis-
comfiture to the federal interest.
This approach is not without its problems, not the least
of which is the determination of the applicable state law itself.'30
There are also problems with the effect of state court holdings
on federal court actions and the weight which must be attached
to amendments to the state statute. Such difficulties are com-
mon whenever there is use of state law in federal courts and
therefore do not strongly militate against selective incorporation
as the best alternative.
129. E.g., A=IZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-729 (A) (1956); CAr. CODE Crv.
PRo. § 580 (b) (West 1955).
130. See Mishkin, supra note 94, at 808.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The courts must find some way to give greater effect to state
rules regarding deficiency judgments where the FHA is involved
than is now the case. Although View Crest establishes a decided
inclination toward the use of federal law in the general area of
FHA mortgages, a careful analysis of the specific area of de-
ficiency judgments reveals that federal interests in this particu-
lar aspect of FHA mortgages are not strong enough to over-
come what amounts to a presumption of state law. 13 1 The cru-
cial failure of the line of cases from View Crest to Stadium
is the summary treatment given state law simply on the basis
of federal involvement in the transactions and the desire to pro-
tect the federal security interest without really considering
the strength of that interest. No assuredly correct solution
in this area can be determined without a close look at the
strengths of the state interests involved. Preemption of sub-
stantial systems of state procedures must occur only when the
federal interest itself is substantial and where giving effect to
state law would significantly damage that interest. Where state
law governs the whole transaction which gives rise to a defici-
ency judgment where the FHA is not involved and also governs
if the mortgagee chooses not to assign to the FHA when it is
involved, preemption of the state law on the basis of minimal in-
convenience to the federal government is unjustified.
Where a significant local interest is involved in the ab-
sence of irreconcilable conflict with long-range objectives of fed-
eral policy, a federal policy of the incorporation of state law
controlling deficiency judgments seems the most promising al-
ternative. In this way all the parties to the mortgage and in-
surance transactions are subject to the same rules of law in seek-
ing a deficiency judgment and a more predictable result is
achieved. Of course, the incorporation of state laws requires the
FHA to prosecute its actions under separate laws in different
states, but the many locations of FHA offices and the present
use of state law in the planning stages indicate that the FHA's
adjustment would be a small burden. On balance the strength
of state interests outweigh the minor litigational inconveniences
the FHA would suffer.
131. See Note, Federal Courts-Choice of Controlling Law in Cases
Involving Federally Insured Mortgages, 49 N.C.L. REv. 358, 367 (1970);
Note, State Statutory Redemption Rights and the FHA: Reconciliation
of Real & Illusory Conflicts, 49 B.U.L. REv. 717, 739-41 (1969).
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